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delimited by a process of inclusion or exclusion as the cases arise. As
was said in the case of Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck: "It is not safe to
do more than deal with the subject on broad lines because misconduct
is always a question of fact which depends upon an infinite variety of
circumstances, including the past record and general character of
the alleged delinquent."23 Other circumstances to be considered are
whether the act occurred during the hours of employment, whether
it occurred on the employer's premises, whether it occurred while
the employee was engaged in his work and whether the employee
took advantage of the employment relation in order to commit the act.
MALCOLM LASSMAN
RIGHT OF SURVIVING DIVORCED PARENT TO CUSTODY
OF CHILDREN
An interesting.and controversial question in the field of domestic
relations is whether, when the divorced parent with custody of the
children dies, the custody automatically inures to the surviving par-
ent, or whether the court which granted the divorce and awarded cus-
tody has continuing jurisdiction over the children.
The question is considered in the case of State ex rel. Gregory v.
Superior Court.1 On August 31, 1954, the wife was granted a divorce
and custody of the children by the Superior Court of Marion County,
Room No. 5. She died on February 27, 196o. The father's sisters filed a
petition in ,the same court seeking custody of the children and to en-
join the father from taking custody. After suffering an adverse ruling,
the father filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Su-
perior Court of Marion County, Room No. 1, seeking to have custody
of the children granted to him. The latter court ordered the father's
petition to be -transferred to Room No. 5 to be consolidated with the
prior action in which the father had suffered an adverse ruling.
The father sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of
Indiana, which by a three-to-two decision entered a decree directing
Room No. 1 to take jurisdiction of the father's action. Justice Jackson,
presenting the majority opinion, reasoned that upon the death of the
parent who had custody under the divorce decree, the right to custody
of the children automatically inured to the surviving parent, and that
2Id. at 640-41.
2176 N.E.2d 126 (Ind. ig6i).
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this right could be asserted in any available court of co-ordinate juris-
diction by a writ of habeas corpus.
2
There were two dissenting opinions,3 one of which was by Judge
Achor who -took the view that upon the death of the parent having
legal custody of the children, the surviving parent does not automatic-
ally gain the right to custody, but that the original court retains juris-
diction over the custody of the children. He reasoned that the court
granting a divorce has the continuing duty to see that the child of
the divorced parties, who, in a sense is a ward of the court, is properly
cared for.4 Therefore, in light of this dissent, the surviving parent
must seek a modification of the original divorce decree in order to ob-
tain legal custody of the children.
The prevailing rule is that the divorce decree abates upon the
death of one of the parties, and the custody of the children automatic-
ally passes to the surviving parent. 5 Therefore, if the surviving par-
ent has possession of the child after the death of .the parental cus-
todian, and such custody is unopposed, no judicial determination is
necessary.6 But when custody of the surviving parent is opposed, and
such parent has possession of the child, he will be required to appear
and defend in the court where those opposing have initiated action.
7
However, if the party opposing the right of -the surviving parent to
custody has possession of the child, then the parent may bring an in-
dependent proceeding of -habeas corpus in any available court of ap-
propriate jurisdiction.8
The numerous jurisdictions which follow the prevailing rule usu-
ally emphasize the right of the surviving parent to custody of the
2Id. at 129.
3The dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Landis concerned the procedural
matter of the father filing a petition in Room No. i after suffering an adverse ruling
in Room No. 5, and is not pertinent to the present discussion.
4176 N.E.2d at 132.
5Brown v. Brown, 218 Ark. 622, 238 S.W.ad 482 (1951); In re De Leon, 70
Cal. App. 1, 232 Pac. 738 (Dist. Ct. App. 1924); Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454,
it, Pac. 21 (i9so); Girtman v. Girtman, 191 Ga. 173, 11 S.E.2d 782 (19.10); May
v. May, 162 Kan. 425, 176 P.2d 533 (1947); Barry v. Sparks, 3o6 Mass. 80, 27 N.E.2d
728 (1940); State ex rel. Gravelle v. Rensch, 23o Minn. 16o, 40 N.W.2d 881 (195o);
Kienlen v. Kienlen, 227 Minn. 137, 34 N.W.2d 351 (1948); Schumacher v. Schumacher,
223 S.W.2d 841 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949); Leclerc v. Leclerc, 85 N.H. 121, 155 At. 249
(1931); In re Thorne, 240 N.Y. 444, 148 N.E. 630 (1925); Hughes v. Bowen, 193 Okla.
269, 143 P.2d 139 (1943). See Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1352 (1931) for additional cases
following the majority approach.
"In re Frank, 41 Wash. 2d 294, 248 P.2d 553 (1952).
7See, e.g., Kienlen v. Kienlen, 227 Minn. 137, 34 N.V.2d 351 (1948).
"See Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 258 (1955).
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children.0 Other cases following this rule emphasize that the adju-
cation in a divorce action goes no further than to adjudicate rights
between 'the husband and wife.10
Among -the jurisdictions following the majority approach," it has
been held that upon the death of a parent who was awarded custody
of a child in a divorce proceeding, the order of award immediately
ceases to be effective, because there is no one upon whom it can op-
erate, or anyone in existence who can assert any rights thereunder.'
2
But the majority rule has been modified in three jurisdictions so
as to permit an insertion of a provision for continuance of the decree
as it relates to custody beyond the joint lives of the parents.' 3 Hence,
it would logically appear that under the majority approach, a surviv-
ing parent who has possession of the children is not required to ob-
tain a modification of the divorce decree to retain custody. However,
if he does not have possession of the children, he may institute habeas
corpus proceedings in an appropriate court.
Where the parental custodian appoints a testamentary guardian
other than the surviving parent, such appointment is not valid against
the rights of the surviving parent.14 It has been held that the parental
custodian's right "does not descend nor can it be transmitted," 5 but
the surviving parent has an immediate right to custody.
The virtues of the prevailing rule are clear. It is apparent that
ordinarily children should be under the care and protection of one of
their natural guardians, 16 and the majority approach succeeds in this
purpose. Then too, assuming both parents are fit, the divorce decree
is an adjudication between the spouses, and the issue of custody is
Brown v. Brown, 218 Ark. 622, 238 S.W.2d 482 ('95); Girtman v. Girtman,
19t Ga. 173, 11 S.E.2d 782 (1940); May v. May, 162 Kan. 425, 176 P.2d 533 (1947);
State ex rel. Gravelle v. Rensch, 230 Minn. i6o, 40 N.V.2d 881 (ig5o).
"0In re De Leon, 7o Cal. App. 1, 232 Pac. 738 (Dist. Ct. App. 1924); Kienlen v.
Kienlen, 227 Minn. 137, 34 N.W.2d 351 (1948).
"1Brown v. Brown, 218 Ark. 622, 238 S.W.2d 482 (1951); Girtman v. Girtman,
191 Ga. 173, i1 S.E.2d 782 (1940); May v. May, 162 Kan. 425, 176 P.2d 533 (1947);
State ex rel. Gravelle v. Rensch, 230 Minn. 16o, 40 N.V.2d 881 (1950). In
Schumacher v. Schumacher, 223 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949) the court stated:
"When we say ... that the court which grants a divorce retains jurisdiction to de-
termine the custody of a minor child until the child attains its majority, what we
actually mean is that it retains jurisdiction until that eventuality is reached
provided, both parents continue to live."
'ln re De Leon, 70 Cal. App. 1, 232 Pac. 738 (Dist. Ct. App. 1924).
1ln re Brown, 7 Alaska 411 (1926); In re Allen, 162 Cal. 625, 124 Pac. 237
(1t2); Barry v. Sparks, 306 Mass. 8o, 27 N.E.2d 728 (194o).
'"Brown v. Brown, 218 Ark. 622, 238 S.V.2d 482 (1951).
151d. at 484.
'May v. May, 162 Kan. 425, 176 P.2d 533 (1947).
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weighed only as between their respective rights as parents. The right
of the parent who failed to obtain custody is a subordinate one; but
when the parental custodian dies, the surviving parent's right be-
comes the primary one, and he is entitled to custody of the children.,
There is authority which holds that custody does not automatical-
ly vest in the surviving parent, but that the court which granted the
divorce retains jurisdictions notwithstanding the fact that the sur-
viving parent may or may not have possession of the child after the
death of the parental custodian. In United States v. Green,'9 where the
father, as surviving parent, instituted a habeas corpus proceeding
against the maternal grandparents to acquire custody of his child,
the court said that it was a mistake to suppose that they were "bound
to deliver over the infant to his father, or that [he had] ... an abso-
lute vested right in the custody."2 0 While it is recognized that the
rights of neither parent should be disregarded, "yet the welfare of
the child is superior to the claims of either parent."
2'
Under the minority view, the surviving parent is compelled to seek
a modification of the divorce decree as a prerequisite to obtaining
legal custody.2 2 In this regard, the Florida court has said:
"[T]hat portion of the [divorce] decree respecting custody of the
children stands on a different footing from that portion dis-
solving the bonds of matrimony. The latter is final, once the
time for taking an appeal has expired; the former is, in a sense,
interlocutory, and may be modified from tine to time as the
welfare of the children requires."
23
Thus, once the court acquires jurisdiction to determine the custody of
1 Kienlen v. Kienlen, 227 Minn. 137, 34 N.W.2d 351 (1948). There the court
said, "The natural rights of the father are not completely annulled by a divorce
decree awarding custody of the child to the mother, but are merely suspended
for the time being and are revived in full force by the mother's death."
1'Snead v. Davis, 265 Ala. 229, 90 So. 2d 825 (1956); Cone v. Cone, 62 So. 2d 907
(Fla. 1953); Jarrett v. Jarrett, 415 Il. 126, 112 N.E.2d 694 (1953); Pinney v.
Sulzen, 91 Kan. 407, 137 Pac. 987 (1914); Purdy v. Ernst, 93 Kan. 157, 143 Pac. .129
(914); Edwards v. Engledorf, 182 S.W.2d 6o3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944); In re Krauthoff,
191 Mo. App. 149, 177 S.W. 1112, i18 (1915); Phipps v. Phipps, 168 Mo. App. 697,
154 S.W. 825 (1913); Neil v. Neil, 38 Ohio St. 558 (1883); In re Hampshire, 17 Ohio
App. 139 (1922); In re Ellenburg, 131 Ore. 440, 283 Pac. 27 (1929).
ID26 Fed. Cas. 30 (No. 15256) (C.C.D.R.I. 1824). There is no explanation for
the style of the case or how the United States became a party to the suit, unless
it is a shortened form of United States ex rel.
20Id. at 32.
-In re Krauthoff, 191 Mo. App. 149, 177 S.W. 1112, 119 (1915).
*-'In Tanner v. Tanner, 78 Ohio App. 178, 62 N.E.2d 654 (1945), the court
reasoned that the surviing parent's right to the custody of the child is not "absolute,"
for the court must-look after the best interests of the child.
" Cone v. Cone, 62 So. 2d 9o7, 9o9 (Fla. 1953).
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the children it is not normally relinquished until the children reach
majority.
24
In line with the minority approach, it has been held that the death
of the parental custodian does not affect the power of the court of
equity that has assumed jurisdiction over the custody of the children.
The children become wards of the court by virtue of the decree, and
no one succeeds to the right of custody of the children because of the
death of the parental custodian. His death merely serves to require
the court to make other provisions for the custody of the children.25
The most important point to consider in this area of conflict is
what should be the status of the child as regards custody immediately
after the death of the parental custodian. There must be some pro-
vision for the care and custody of the child immediately upon the
death of the parental custodian. Under the majority approach, the
surviving parent is immediately vested with legal custody,26 while
under the minority approach, there may often be an interim period
before the issue of custody is even brought to the attention of the
court.27 Even though there is a possibility of the surviving parent
being an unfit custodian, that slight possibility, over the long run,
would seem to be outweighed by the fact that, in most instances, the
surviving parent is likely to be a better custodian than any other per-
son that may assume custody on his own initiative. Therefore, as a
practical matter, it would seem that the majority approach is more
adapted to the immediate needs of the child upon the death of the
parental custodian.
Suppose, however, that custody by the surviving parent is never
opposed. Under the majority approach the courts presume that the
surviving parent is fit and proper to care for the child; therefore, a
judicial determination of his fitness is unnecessary. 28 As stated by the
court in In re De Leon:
"[B]estowal of the custody of a minor in a divorce action is
not, unless otherwise provided by statute, an adjudication of the
fitness of the parent who is for the time denied the right to re-
tain possession of -the child. It is nothing more than the expres-
sion of the court's belief that, under the circumstances then ex-
isting, the welfare of the child would be best subserved by plac-
ing said child with one of the parents rather than the other."
29
2Edwards v. Engeldorf, 18o S.W.2d 603, 604 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944).
- Snead v. Davis, 265 Ala. 229, 9o So. 2d 285 (1956). But see Wilkinson v. Deming,
8o Ill. 342 (1875).
2"Woodford v. Superior Ct., 82 Ariz. 181, 309 P.2d 973 (1957).
- See, e.g., Pinney v. Sulzen, 91 Kan. 407, 137 Pac. 987 (1914).
,Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454, 1 Pac. 21 (191o).
27
o
Cal. App. 1, 232 Pac. 738, 742 (Dist. Ct. App. 1924).
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The law presumes that it is for the child's best interest to be under the
nurture and care of his natural protector, 30 and the feeling is that the
surviving parent should be entitled to immediate custody of his child
without any judicial determination. It may be said that the surviving
parent has the right to custody subject to a condition subsequent, that
if it be later shown that he is not a fit custodian the child may be
taken from him.
Under the minority approach, on the other hand, the surviving
parent is regarded as a preferred custodian,31 but the courts require
him to seek a modification of the divorce decree.32 In obtaining such
a modification, there would have to be some adjudication as to the
fitness of the surviving parent.33 Thus, there is some virtue in the fact
that at least there is some adjudication of the fitness of the surviving
parent prior to an alteration of legal custody of children.
If the custody of the surviving parent is contested, the final point
to consider relates to which court should try the issue. Under the
minority approach, only the original divorce court could determine
such an issue,34 while under the majority approach, the surviving
parent may institute proceedings in any available court.3 5 It seems
that, as a matter of practice, the original court should be preferred.
Such court having heard the evidence of the parties to the divorce
relating to the welfare of the children, and having had the duty of
looking after the care and welfare of the children following the divorce
of the parents, is in a better position than any other court to again
determine the issue of the custody of the children.
The substantive determination under both the minority and ma-
jority rules will likely be the same. Regardless of the jurisdiction, there
is a presumption of the fitness of the surviving parent,3 6 which will
put the burden of proving otherwise on the contesting party. Similarly,
it appears that all courts, whether following the minority or majority
approach, apply an absolute rather than a relative standard in the
determination of fitness of the surviving parent in a contested cus-
m"May v. May, 162 Kan. 425, 176 P.2d 533 (19.17).
3'United States v. Green, 26 Fed. Cas. 3o (No. 15256) (C.C.D.R.I. 182.1).
"'See note 23 supra.
"This information was acquired from Mr. J. H. Barney, a practicing attorney
in Petersburg, Virginia, who is primarily engaged in the field of domestic relations.
"'Baker v. Baker, 85 Ohio App. 470, 89 N.E.2d 123 (1949).
"State ex rel. Walker v. Crouse, 240 Mo. App. 389, 20 S.W.2d 7,19 ('917).
"Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454, i1 Pac. 21 (19,0); Hutchinson v. Harrison,
t3o Va. 302, 107 S.E. 742 (1921).
